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We show the existence of a twin peaks relation between trust and the size of the welfare 
state that stems from two opposing forces. Uncivic people support large welfare states 
because they expect to benefit from them without bearing their costs. But civic individuals 
support generous benefits and high taxes only when they are surrounded by trustworthy 
individuals. We provide empirical evidence for these behaviors and this twin peaks relation in 
the OECD countries. 
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1 Introduction
Why does the welfare state take such a variety of different forms across countries? To this
long-established question a recent literature responds with the hypothesis that the size of the
welfare state depends positively on the country level of trust. In particular, Rothstein and
Uslaner (2005) and Rothstein et al. (2010) argue that the persistence of large welfare states in
Scandinavian countries is explained by the trustworthiness of their citizens. Those large welfare
states, it is argued, rely on conditional cooperation. Trustworthy, or “civic” individuals consent
to pay high rates of tax only because they are convinced that their compatriots are paying their
taxes too, and not misusing social benefits.
We will show that this explanation is only one part of a much broader story. Figure 1(a)
shows that the observed cross-country relationship between trust and the size of welfare states is
not monotonic, contrary to the traditional claim, but can be visualized as twin peaks. Although
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and Italy display limited trust, their welfare states are as
large as those of Scandinavian countries. Similarly, Figure 1(b) shows a twin peaks relation
between the transparency and the size of the different OECD welfare states. Our paper provides
a rational and testable prediction for this puzzle. We argue that this twin peaks curve arises
from a conflict inherent in the attitudes of civic and uncivic individuals towards the welfare
state. Uncivic citizens, the sort who evade their tax obligations while seeking to extract all
they can from social benefits, will support the expansion of the welfare state more strongly
than civic citizens will, since they expect to benefit the most from it while shirking the costs.
A rise in the share of uncivic citizens could thus increase the demand for a generous welfare
state. However, an opposing force is also at play. Civic citizens will be less inclined to support
high taxes if they expect to be surrounded by uncivic individuals who do not pay taxes and
abuse social benefits.
The first part of the paper develops a political economy model where these two opposing
forces can lead to a twin peaks relation between trust and the size of the welfare state. The
model comprises trustworthy and untrustworthy individuals. Civic individuals cheat neither on
taxes nor on social benefits. Uncivic individuals cheat on both taxes and social benefits if this is
in their own interest. The model predicts that the first peak of the twin peaks relation appears
at the point where political power shifts from untrustworthy to trustworthy citizens. This shift
is associated with an immediate drop in support for the welfare state, since trustworthy citizens
are less favorable to redistribution than untrustworthy citizens. The second peak appears when
everyone is civic. In this situation, all individuals strongly support the welfare state because
nobody cheats on taxes and social benefits.
Next, we extend the model to take into consideration the behavior of the civil servants
who administer the welfare state. We make the plausible assumption that the civic spirit
obtaining among public officials will mirror that of the population. The model can then generate
the observed twin peaks relation between the transparency and the size of the welfare state
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documented in Figure 1(b). Overall, the model lays down the theoretical foundations for the
existence of a large and corrupt welfare state in a society populated by numerous untrustworthy
individuals who cheat on social benefits and dodge their taxes. Conversely, the welfare state can
be both large and transparent – but only if the share of trustworthy individuals is sufficiently
large. The model can thus explain the existence of support for large welfare states in both
low-trust and high-trust countries, but with very contrasting degrees of transparency.
We then test the predictions and mechanisms of the model with both macro and micro
evidence. We start by providing macro evidence for the twin peaks curve across OECD coun-
tries. We perform piecewise linear regressions – letting the data endogenously determine the
breakpoint – between various measures of the generosity of the welfare state and a handful of
measures of trust and trustworthiness. We check the robustness of the results by controlling for
alternative variables – ethnic segmentation, democracy score, and real GDP per capita – that
have been found to influence the size of the welfare state. We then test the main individual
mechanisms of the model by using international social surveys. From the World Values Survey,
we find that uncivic individuals support the welfare state more strongly than civic ones. In
particular, individuals who declare that it may be excusable to claim government benefits to
which they are not entitled or to avoid a fare on public transport, are found to support more
generous social programs than trustworthy individuals who declare that there is never an excuse
for cheating. From the European Social Survey, we also find that individuals who think that
they are surrounded by people of a more trustworthy kind exhibit a stronger degree of support
for the welfare state.
Our paper follows two strands of related research. The first strand deals with the existence
of a positive and monotonic relationship between trust and the welfare state. In particular in
political science, Hetherington (1998, 2004) argues that the decline in political trust has played
a central role in the demise of progressive policy in the United States over the last several
decades. Rothstein and Uslaner (2005), Rothstein et al. (2010), Bergh and Bjørnskov (2011),
and Bjørnskov and Svendsen (2013) claim that the scope of the welfare state in OECD countries
is limited by distrust towards others and towards governmental institutions. The lineage of the
notion can be traced to Adam Smith, who stressed in The Wealth of Nations that “where the
people have entire confidence in their magistrates, are convinced of the necessity of the tax for
the support of the state, and believe that it will be faithfully applied to that purpose, such
conscientious and voluntary payment may sometimes be expected.”1 This explanation fits well
with the specific group of very high-trusting countries. But it cannot account for the existence
of large and non-transparent welfare states in very low-trusting countries. Our paper stands
out from this strand of research in at least two ways. First, we provide a rationale for the
existence of a twin peaks curve. We also explain why large welfare states might be supported
in both high-trusting and low-trusting countries, but are transparent in the former group of
1Smith (1904), book V, chapter II. See Evensky (2005) for a thorough discussion.
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countries only. Second, we provide macro and micro evidence on the twin peaks relationship
between trust and support for the welfare state.
A second research theme emerges out of the economics of redistribution. The seminal
explanations of the support for redistribution looked at the distribution of incomes before taxes
and transfers (see Alesina and Glaeser 2004) and at prevailing beliefs about income mobility
(Piketty 1995, Bénabou and Ok 2001, Alesina and La Ferrara 2005). Alternative explanations
of the demand for redistribution have stressed the role of fairness (Corneo and Gruner 2002,
Alesina and Angeletos 2005, Luttens and Valfort 2008), reciprocal altruism (Fong 2001, Fong
et al. 2006), inherited preference ingrained in past historical experience (Corneo and Gruner
2002, Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln 2007, Luttmer and Singhal 2011, Alesina and Giuliano
2011), ethnic segmentation and group loyalty (Luttmer 2001 and Alesina and Glaeser 2004),
the desire to act in accordance with public values (Corneo and Gruner 2002), and the role of
the electoral system (Alesina et al. 2001 and Persson and Tabellini 2002). The originality of
our contribution is to stress the central role of what might be called "civicness" and beliefs in
the trustworthiness of others. In particular, we exploit specific questions about the perceived
behavior of compatriots with respect to various social benefits and we show that these perceived
behaviors are significantly associated with support for the welfare state.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model that rationalizes the twin
peaks relation between trust and the size of the welfare state. Section 3 provides evidence for
the twin peaks curve for OECD countries. Section 4 tests the main predictions of the model at
the individual level. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
This section analyzes the theoretical foundations of the relationship between trust, trustwor-
thiness and the scope of the welfare state.
2.1 The setup
There is a continuum of individuals of measure one and a government which levies taxes and
provides social benefits. Every individual is either trustworthy or untrustworthy. The share
of trustworthy (or “civic”) individuals is denoted by α ∈ [0, 1]. Civic individuals pay taxes
and only claim benefits to which they are entitled. Untrustworthy (or “uncivic”) individuals
are purely opportunistic: they cheat on taxes and social benefits whenever this can raise their
income. All individuals have the same preferences over consumption. For the sake of simplicity,
we use a logarithmic utility function ln(c), where c stands for consumption.
Every individual produces y > 0 units of the consumption good with probability pi ∈ (0, 1)
and a lower level, denoted by y0 ∈ (0, y), with probability 1 − pi. Productive individuals, who
produce y, must pay a tax, denoted by t, to finance benefits, denoted by b, provided to those
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who produce y0. Productive individuals can hide their production with probability 1− p. For
instance, if it is possible for them to work in the informal sector, their production cannot be
observed by the government. Civic individuals always declare their true level of production.
Thus, they pay the required tax if they are productive and they claim benefits only if they
produce the low level y0. Uncivic individuals able to hide their production never pay taxes and
always claim benefits whatever their level of production.
The timing of events is as follows. First, individuals are born either civic or uncivic. Second,
individuals vote on benefits and taxes. Third, a share pi of individuals produce y and a share
1− pi produce y0. Then, taxes are paid and benefits are distributed.
2.2 Support for the welfare state
We first analyze the degree of support for the welfare state from civic and uncivic individuals.
Every individual prefers the settings of tax and benefits that maximize her expected utility
subject to the budget constraint of the government. The tax receipt of the government comes
from the tax paid by the piα productive civic individuals and from the ppi(1 − α) productive
uncivic individuals whose production cannot be hidden. The benefits are provided to the (1−pi)
unproductive individuals and to the pi(1 − p)(1 − α) productive uncivic individuals who can
claim benefits because their production can be hidden. Accordingly, the budget constraint of
the government is
pit [α + p(1− α)] = [(1− pi) + pi(1− p)(1− α)] b. (1)
• Civic individuals expect to pay the tax t if they are productive and to get benefits b
otherwise. Their preferred taxes and benefits maximize
pi ln(y − t) + (1− pi) ln(y0 + b), (2)
subject to the budget constraint (1).2 The optimal tax is
tcivic = (1− pi)y − (1− pi) + pi(1− p)(1− α)
α + p(1− α) y0 ≥ 0. (3)
This equation shows that the preferred tax of civic individuals increases with the share
of civic individuals. The reason is that the proportion of people abusing social benefits
is smaller when the share of civic individuals is greater. Accordingly, the welfare state
provides social insurance more effectively, the more civic individuals there are. This
fosters support for the welfare state. In the limit case where all individuals are civic
(α = 1), the tax, equal to (1 − pi)(y − y0), is necessarily positive. However, as the share
of civic individuals becomes smaller, the preferred tax of civic individuals will drop. It
2The logarithmic utility function implies that the optimal tax always satisfies t < y. This condition holds
true for civic and uncivic individuals.
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can even drop to zero if the probability p of tax evasion being detected is small enough:
below the threshold p¯ = y0/ [y + pi(y0 − y)] . In this case, the share of people who pay
tax is so small with respect to the share of people who get benefits that civic individuals
become unwilling to pay taxes, because the return to taxes has become too small. In what
follows, we shall assume, for the sake of simplicity, that the probability of tax evasion being
detected is above the threshold p¯ so that the optimal tax chosen by civic individuals is
always positive. Once the tax tcivic is known, it is possible, using the budget constraint (1),
to compute the preferred benefits bcivic of civic individuals. From this, we can compute the
ratio of consumption of unproductive individuals, y0 + b, over consumption of productive
individuals, y − t, chosen by civic individuals, which takes the value:
ρcivic ≡ y0 + bcivic
y − tcivic =
α + p(1− α)
1 + pi
(1−pi)(1− p)(1− α)
. (4)
This equation shows that there is full insurance, i.e. y0 + bcivic = y− tcivic, when everyone
is civic, i.e. when α = 1. When there are uncivic individuals in the population, there is
partial insurance.
• The preferred taxes and benefits of uncivic individuals maximize
pi [p ln(y − t) + (1− p) ln(y + b)] + (1− pi) ln(y0 + b), (5)
subject to the budget constraint (1). This entails that the ratio of the consumption of
unproductive individuals, y0 + b, over the consumption of productive individuals, y − t,
chosen by uncivic individuals can be written.
ρuncivic ≡ y0 + buncivic
y − tuncivic =
ρcivic
p
(
1 +
1
1− pi
y0 + b
y + b
)
. (6)
Support for the welfare state on the part of uncivic individuals increases with the share
of civic individuals (since ρcivic increases with α) for the same reason as support on the
part of civic individuals does. The model also predicts that uncivic individuals desire
more redistribution than civic individuals (since the ratio (y0 + b)/(y − t) defined by
equation (6) is larger than that defined by equation (4)). Uncivic individuals desire more
redistribution for two reasons. First, they benefit from public transfers more frequently
than civic individuals since they claim benefits when their production can be hidden.
Second, they do not bear the full burden of taxation since they dodge taxes when this is
possible.
At this stage, the predictions of the model are that uncivic individuals want more redis-
tribution than civic individuals and that all individuals want more redistribution when they
expect to be surrounded by more civic individuals.
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2.3 The outcome of the vote
Individuals vote on the levels of taxes and benefits that are compatible with the budget con-
straint. Since preferences are single-peaked, we can assume that the outcome of the vote is
defined by the median voter. Taxes are determined by uncivic individuals if the share of civic
individuals is smaller than 1
2
and by civic individuals otherwise. The outcome is represented in
figure 2. The relation between the share of civic individuals and the level of social insurance
displays twin peaks because the support for the welfare state from uncivic individuals is greater
than that of civic individuals. Large welfare states can be supported by a majority of uncivic
individuals who cheat on taxes and benefits. This can explain why countries with a large share
of uncivic individuals like Italy, France and Belgium, can have welfare states as large as civic
countries like the Scandinavian nations.
Moreover, when the median voter is uncivic, the size of the welfare state is inefficiently high.
The maximization of any convex combination of the utilities of civic and uncivic individuals
would yield a lower tax level than the one picked by the median voter.
2.4 Accounting for the transparency of the welfare state
So far, we have assumed that the effectiveness of the welfare state, defined by its ability to
collect taxes and to provide transfers, was given. However, the effectiveness of the state might
also depend on the behavior of officials. It is likely that the civic spirit of officials reflects the
civic spirit of citizens at large. Governments are expected to be more corrupt and less effective
in societies where individuals are less civic.
To take this relation into account, we consider an extension of the model (presented in the
Online Appendix) that incorporates the behavior of officials who levy taxes. Every individual
is working during the day and is an official at night. Civic officials do their duty: they levy
taxes which are used to distribute benefits. Uncivic officials are corrupt: they capture the tax
they collect. This framework allows us to account in a simple way for the fact that the share
of uncivic officials is more likely to be higher when there are more uncivic individuals in the
society.
The extended model displays the same twin peaks relationship between the share of civic
individuals and the size of the welfare state. But it yields additional predictions. This theo-
retical extension allows us to predict a non-monotonic relation between the transparency (or
the effectiveness) of welfare states and their size. Societies populated by a majority of uncivic
individuals can support corrupt and ineffective welfare states that can be larger than the more
effective welfare states of societies populated by a majority of civic individuals. This prediction
is consistent with Esping-Andersen’s characterization of welfare states. The corporatist wel-
fare states characteristic of societies with an intermediate level of civicness, such as Belgium,
Germany, Italy, and Austria (see figure 1(a)), do not redistribute very much from the rich to
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the poor, although they are as large as the Nordic welfare states. Our extended model echoes
Milanovic’s idea that the motives behind the redistributive activity of the state differ across
countries (see Milanovic 2000 among others).
2.5 Trustworthiness as a continuous variable
The results presented to this point flowed from a model where trustworthiness is a binary
variable. But these results retain validity if trustworthiness is a continuous variable. Assume
that there is a utility cost T to being uncivic (T ≥ 0). T can be interpreted as a measure of
trustworthiness. It is distributed in the population with the cumulative distribution function
denoted by F , which is assumed to be continuous. Let Vuncivic denote the expected utility of
individuals who behave in an uncivic way (defined by equation (5)) and let Vcivic denote the
expected utility of individuals who behave in a civic way (defined by equation (2)). Individuals
decide to be civic if Vcivic > Vuncivic − T. Therefore, the proportion of civic individuals in the
population is α = 1− F (Vcivic − Vuncivic). In this setup, the share of civic individuals becomes
endogenous. Since individuals solve the same type of problem as in the benchmark model
where trustworthiness is a binary variable, it can be verified (see the Online Appendix) that
every individual wants more welfare state when the share of civic individuals in the population
bulks larger. For the same reason, uncivic individuals desire more taxes and benefits than civic
individuals.
Assume now that the distribution of T changes according to the mapping M : F (T ) →
F˜ (T ) = F (T ) − ∆(T ), with ∆(T ) ≥ 0. We thus associate with the distribution F a new
distribution F˜ with a larger share of trustworthy individuals (i.e. individuals with high values
of T ). If the change in the distribution is such that the majority of individuals remains either
civic or uncivic, the increase in the share of trustworthy individuals induces an increase in the
size of the welfare state since every individual wants more welfare state when the share of civic
individuals in the population grows larger. If there is a small change in the distribution which
implies that the majority of individuals switches from uncivic to civic behavior, there is a drop
in support for the welfare state because civic individuals want less taxes and benefits than
uncivic individuals.
In conclusion, the twin peaks relation between the share of civic individuals and the size
of the welfare state can be derived in a context where trustworthiness is a continuous variable
rather than a binary one.
3 Macro-level evidence
In this section, we test the prediction of the model at the aggregate level. Our model predicts
that the relationship between the share of trustworthy individuals and the scope of redistri-
bution is discontinuous. It displays twin peaks with two increasing relations. To test this
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prediction, we implement piecewise regressions with an endogenous breakpoint, where the de-
pendent variable is a measure of the generosity of the welfare state and the right-hand variable
of interest captures the share of trustworthy individuals.
3.1 Data and methodology
We use four different measures of the size of the welfare state at the country level. The first
two measures are from the OECD Social Expenditure Database: the share of total public
social expenditure in percentage of GDP, and per capita public social expenditure. The third
measure is the overall generosity score of the welfare state, computed by Scruggs (2004).3 The
last measure is the share gain of the bottom two deciles computed by Milanovic (2000).4
Parameter α of the model represents the share of trustworthy individuals. It is measured
with the country’s share of respondents who answer “never justifiable” to the following question
from the World Values Survey: “Please tell me for each of the following statements whether
you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between [. . . ]: Claiming
government benefits to which you are not entitled.” This variable is labeled civism in the
analysis. According to the model, the parameter α can also be interpreted as the perceived
share of trustworthy individuals. We thus use an alternative measure based on the share of
respondents who answer “most people can be trusted” to the following question from the World
Values Survey: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that
you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” This variable is referred to as trust in
the empirical analysis. Finally, the model also predicts that parameter α is positively related
to the perceived corruption of the welfare state. We test this relation by using the corruption
perception index from Transparency International and label it corruption perception.5
In order to uncover the twin peaks relationship between the generosity of the welfare state
and the share α of trustworthy individuals, we estimate the following model:{
zi = a1 + b1xi + εi, if xi < γ,
zi = a2 + b2xi + εi, if xi ≥ γ,
(7)
where zi is welfare state generosity, xi is the measure of the model’s parameter α in country i,
and γ is the breakpoint to be determined by the data. We estimate these equations using ordi-
3Scruggs (2004)’s generosity score summarizes the generosity of three social insurance programs: sickness,
unemployment and pension. Calculations are based on an average productive worker. For each program and each
country, a score is assigned following the program’s characteristics (replacement rate, qualification conditions,
duration, etc.) and coverage. The final index is computed as the sum of the three scores and reflects increasing
generosity of the system.
4The share gain of a given decile is defined by Milanovic (2000) as “the difference between the share of [this]
decile in factor and [the share of this decile in] disposable income”.
5The number of countries is unbalanced across the different waves of the World Values Survey. We thus use
the questionnaires from 1995, 2000, and 2005, and compute averages of civism and trust across waves for which
the welfare states generosity data are available. The same remarks apply for corruption perception.
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nary least squares regressions and bootstrapped standard errors to account for the small sample
size. The optimal breakpoint is chosen as the value of γ that minimizes the overall residual sum
of squares across both groups of observations. To determine the breakpoint endogenously, we
use the method developed by Andrews (1993, 2003) building on Quandt (1960). This method
is grounded in the observation that the correct test statistic is the maximum F-statistic over
the whole procedure – i.e. over all candidates’ breakpoints – and does not follow a standard
distribution (see Hansen 2001 for a clear presentation). To the best of our knowledge, the
distribution of this statistic is unknown for finite samples. Hence, we construct p-values of this
distribution using a bootstrap procedure as described by Diebold and Chen (1996).6
3.2 Results
Table 1 displays the estimated coefficients from the model above. The right-hand variable is
civism. In the first column, the dependent variable is the share of total public social expendi-
ture in GDP. This column shows that the standard test by Chow (1960) strongly rejects the
null hypothesis of a single regime. When we apply the method developed by Andrews (1993,
2003) to let the breakpoint be determined by the data, we get a p-value of 0.01 that rejects
the hypothesis that only one regime exists. We also use the bootstrap procedure to test for
differences in intercepts and slopes on both sides of the breakpoint, and to test for the existence
of a discontinuity at break, such that p-values of these tests also take into account that the
breakpoint has been endogenously determined. The test for the discontinuity at the breakpoint
yields a p-value of 0.02 that confirms that countries just below the threshold exhibit substan-
tially higher generosity of their welfare state than countries just above it. Moreover, we uncover
an increasing relationship between civism and the size of the welfare state on each side of the
breakpoint, in line with the prediction of the theoretical model. The relation is positive and
strongly significant above the breakpoint. Below the breakpoint, the relationship is positive,
although not statistically significant.
We check the robustness of the results by controlling for the alternative determinants of
the demand for redistribution proposed by the literature so far, such as ethnic segmentation
(Luttmer 2001 and Alesina and Glaeser 2004), and the electoral system (Alesina et al. 2001
and Persson and Tabellini 2002). We include in the regressions ethnic segmentation– from
Alesina et al. (2003) –, the level of democracy – using the imputed polity score from Freedom
House –, and the (log of) real GDP per capita in piecewise regressions for OECD countries. To
achieve this, we first regress the country level of redistribution on these determinants. Then,
we regress the residuals from this estimation on civism. This two-step procedure tests whether
the relation between welfare state generosity and civism has two regimes, conditional on the
other potential determinants of the welfare state. The estimated coefficients are presented in
the second column of Table 1. The formal statistical tests reject the hypothesis that data come
6See the Online Appendix for the detailed presentation of the procedure.
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from one regime and support the alternative that data are generated by two regimes. Also, the
hypothesis of no discontinuity in the relationship between civism and the conditional share of
total public social expenditure is rejected. We still find a positive relation between the scope
of the welfare state and civism on each side of the breakpoint.
We replicate the same analysis with alternative measures of the size of the welfare state
in columns 3 to 8 of Table 1. With those alternative measures we do find a statistically
significant twin peaks relation, despite the fact that Scruggs (2004)’s generosity score and
Milanovic (2000)’s share gain are available for a smaller sample of countries. We find only a
mixed result for the share gain of the bottom two deciles. The Chow-p value rejects the null
hypothesis of a single regime but the Quandt-Andrews p-value does not. Another interesting
result is the stability of the estimated coefficient for the endogenous breakpoint. We observe
only slight variation in its value despite changes in dependent variables and samples.
Tables 2 and 3 replicate the estimations discussed above with trust and corruption percep-
tion as the right-hand variable instead of civism. Table 2 shows the results for trust. We find
strong evidence of a twin peaks relationship with the various measures of the welfare state’s
generosity. As with civism, the only inconclusive result comes from the measurement of the
conditional generosity score: the Chow-p value rejects the null hypothesis of a single regime but
the Quandt-Andrews p-value does not. Table 3 shows the result with the corruption perception
index as the right-hand variable. The evidence of the existence of two regimes is weaker. But
overall results confirm the existence of a discontinuity in the relationship.
In conclusion, Tables 1–3 reject the hypothesis of a monotonous and continuous relation
between trust, civism, and perceived corruption on one hand, and the size of welfare state on
the other hand. In line with the prediction of our theoretical model, the evidence supports the
existence of a twin peaks relation, as illustrated by figures 1(a) and 1(b).
4 Individual-level evidence
The model shows that the twin peaks relation between trust and the size of the welfare state
arises from the two types of individual behavior predicted by the model. First, untrustworthy
individuals want more redistribution than trustworthy individuals. Second, individuals provide
more support for the welfare state when they think that they are surrounded by more trust-
worthy individuals. We test those individual-level predictions on micro-data from the World
Values Survey (WVS) and the European Social Survey (ESS).
The empirical evidence presented below is based on regressions of individuals’ opinions on
other subjective variables. This setting calls for prudent interpretation in terms of causality.
Both variables may be correlated because of omitted factors, and the right-hand variable may
also be a rationalization for the left-hand one.7 Although we do not claim causality, we show
7See Hamermesh (2004) among others for a thoughtful discussion of related issues.
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that the empirical individual behavior predicted by the model is consistent with micro evidence.
4.1 Civic spirit
Our model predicts that uncivic individuals want more redistribution than civic individuals
because they are the ones eluding taxation and abusing social benefits. We use the WVS to test
this prediction. We measure civicness by using the following questions: “Please tell me for each
of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or
something in between, using this card.” We use answers to the following statements: “Claiming
government benefits to which you are not entitled”; “Avoiding a fare on public transport”;
“Cheating on taxes when you have a chance”; “Someone accepting a bribe in the course of
their duties”; “Throwing away litter in a public place”; “Buying stolen goods”. The answers
range from 1 for “never justifiable” to 10 for “always justifiable.” Depending on the question,
around 60 to 70 percent of respondents answer “never justifiable” to these questions. The other
answers are chosen by small and equally distributed shares of respondents. We thus distinguish
two main types of individuals: those who claim that the behaviors described in the questions
are “never justifiable” and those who say that they can be justifiable in some cases. For each
question, we create a variable measuring civic spirit which is equal to 1 if the answer is “never
justifiable” and 0 for all other answers.
From the WVS, we measure support for the welfare state with the question: “I’d like you
to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1
means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely
with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose
any number in between. Incomes should be made more equal versus We need larger income
differences as incentives.” We reverse the scale of the answers such that a higher score indicates
greater support for the welfare state.
The relation between civic spirit and support for the welfare state is displayed in columns 1
to 6 of table 4. The explanatory variable of interest is civicness. In all specifications, we include
controls for age, gender, education, income of the household, family status, employment status,
political orientation and religiosity – as defined in table A1 presented in the Online Appendix
–, country fixed effects and time fixed effects for the year of interview. Although we are
using qualitative variables as dependent variables, all coefficients presented in this paper are
obtained using ordinary least squares to ease the interpretation of coefficients. The results
are qualitatively and quantitatively not sensitive to the use of ordered probit or ordered logit
estimation techniques.
Whatever the measure of civicness, the estimated coefficient of civic spirit is negative and
statistically significant. This means that civic individuals want less redistribution than uncivic
individuals, as predicted by the model. The estimated effect of being civic on support for the
welfare state is as large as the effect of gender (or even larger in some cases); and it is as large
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as the effect of being unemployed instead of employed.8
4.2 Generalized trust and perceived behavior of compatriots
Another important prediction of the model is the existence of a positive relation between
generalized trust, in particular the perceived trustworthiness of others, and support for the
welfare state. From the WVS, we use the same question on generalized trust as in the macro-
evidence section. Column 7 of Table 4 shows a positive and statistically significant relationship
between generalized trust and support for the welfare state by using the WVS.
We also exploit the fourth round of the ESS – conducted in 2008 and 2009 – that provides
a specific module on attitudes towards the welfare state. This survey contains a well-designed
measure of support for redistribution by formulating the following question: “Many social
benefits and services are paid for by taxes. If the government had to choose between increasing
taxes and spending more on social benefits and services, or decreasing taxes and spending less on
social benefits and services, which should they do?” Answers range from 0, “Government should
decrease taxes a lot and spend much less on social benefits and services,” to 10, “Government
should increase taxes a lot and spend much more on social benefits and services.” This scale
clearly reflects a graduation in support for the welfare state. Its wording has the advantage
of stressing both the costs and the benefits of the welfare state. This question is also much
more explicit regarding the demand for the welfare state than the ones related to the role
of government in reducing inequalities, traditionally used in the literature (see Alesina and
Giuliano 2011). Besides, the question makes explicit reference to the government of the country
of interview. It is preceded by a series of questions about social benefits and the tax authorities
which make reference to the country where people are being interviewed. We use all countries
for which the variables in which we are interested are available.9
Table 5, illustrates the relationship between trust and support for the welfare state. The
dependent variable is the ESS question on support for the welfare state. All regressions include
controls for age, gender, education, income of the household, family status, employment status,
political orientation and religiosity – as defined in table A2 presented in the Online Appendix
–, and country fixed effects.
In column 1 of table 5, the explanatory variable is generalized trust. It is measured by
the question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you
need to be very careful in dealing with people?” The variable ranges from 0 for “You can’t be
8It might be argued that the civicness-related questions we use reflect certain opinions regarding the poor
rather than actual individual civicness. Yet, two remarks may help to alleviate this concern. First, we control
for political orientation and income, two variables that are likely to capture part of individuals’ attitudes toward
the poor. Second, the civicness question about littering provides an estimate that is in line with our predictions
and does not seem to suffer from such an alternative interpretation.
9Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Latvia,
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey,
Ukraine, United Kingdom.
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too careful” to 10 for “Most people can be trusted.” The coefficient associated with trust is
positive and significant at the 1% level. The magnitude of the coefficient is significant. The
fact of claiming that “Most people can be trusted” rather than “You can’t be too careful” is
associated with an increase in support for the welfare state which is four times larger than the
difference between the demand for redistribution from the unemployed relative to the demand
for redistribution from those in employment. The coefficient associated with political orienta-
tion shows that right-wing individuals express less support for the welfare state. A rise of one
point in the 0–10 distrust-trust scale is associated with about half the effect on the demand for
redistribution of a one point rise in the 0–10 left-right scale. The coefficient associated with
income is not significantly different from zero, suggesting that support for the welfare state is
not significantly influenced by income. Education is positively correlated with support for the
welfare state, but its coefficient is five times smaller than the coefficient associated with trust.
The ESS also provides detailed questions about the perceived trustworthiness of compatriots.
Column 2 of table 5 uses the following question: “Do you think that most people would try to
take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?” The variable is
equal to 0 if the respondent answered “Most people would try to take advantage of me” and 10
if the answer is “Most people would try to be fair.” Column 3 shows the results obtained when
the question is: “Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they
are mostly looking out for themselves?” The variable is equal to 0 if the respondent answered
“People mostly look out for themselves” and 10 if the answer is “People mostly try to be helpful.”
In both cases, these measures of the perceived trustworthiness of others are positively associated
with support for redistribution. The coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level.
We then turn to three more specific questions on the behavior of compatriots with respect
to social benefits. The questions read: "Many people manage to obtain benefits and services
to which they are not entitled"; "Most unemployed people do not really try to find a job";
and "Employees often pretend they are sick in order to stay at home." For each question, the
answers range from 1 for “strongly agree” to 5 for “strongly disagree.”
Column 4 of table 5 shows that beliefs about the way compatriots are (mis)using social
benefits is strongly associated with individual support for the welfare state. The fact of agreeing
strongly rather that disagreeing strongly with the claim “Many people manage to obtain benefits
and services to which they are not entitled” is associated with a reduction in the demand for
redistribution that is about twice as large as the difference between unemployed workers and
employees when it comes to demand for redistribution. Column 5 of table 5 shows that the
demand for redistribution is statistically significant and positively associated with the fact of
believing that unemployed workers do make efforts to find a job. Column 6 of table 5 shows
the same highly significant relation between beliefs about the efforts of employees and support
for the welfare state.
Overall, these results show that there is a strong positive relation between the perceived
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civicness of compatriots and support for the welfare state. Obviously, the demand for redis-
tribution could be linked to other motives and beliefs such as the beliefs one holds about the
determinants of success (Alesina and La Ferrara 2005) or the perception of the fairness of the
society (see Alesina and Angeletos 2005). We show in the Online Appendix that our results
still hold up when such additional motives are explicitly accounted for.
5 Conclusion
This paper shows that the scope of welfare states is associated with trust in a non-trivial way.
Large, corrupt and ineffective welfare states can survive thanks to the support of a majority of
untrustworthy individuals. The creation of large, transparent and effective welfare states needs
a large majority of trustworthy citizens.
These findings might explain why it is so difficult to reform the large welfare states of
Continental European countries despite the widespread consensus that they are less effective
and transparent than their counterparts in Nordic countries. Our paper suggests that their
large size is the consequence of an equilibrium in which the majority of the population is made
up of untrustworthy individuals who exploit the advantages provided by the welfare state at
the expense of a minority of trustworthy individuals.
The long-run sustainability of this equilibrium is, however, an open question. The fact that
all individuals, either trustworthy or untrustworthy, are better off when they are surrounded by
trustworthy individuals suggests that all individuals could coordinate to invest in education in
order to improve the civic spirit of their offspring, to the extent that education can improve civic
spirit (see Glaeser et al. 2007 and Algan et al. 2013). This should improve the effectiveness
and the transparency of the welfare state. However, there are also opposing forces at play.
Generous welfare states provide numerous individuals with incentives to abuse social benefits
and to evade taxation which can undermine civic attitudes (Ljunge 2012).
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Figure 1: The twin peaks relationship between the generosity of the welfare state, trust, and
corruption perception.
(a) Public social expenditure and trust.
(b) Public social expenditure and corruption perception.
Sources: World Values Survey, OECD Social Expenditure Database, and Transparency International. Trust is the share of re-
spondents who answer “most people can be trusted” to the following question of the World Values Survey: “Generally speaking,
would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?”. See section 3 for the
presentation of the procedure used to construct regressions’ lines.
Figure 2: The relation between the share of trustworthy individuals and the scope of the welfare
state.
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Table 4: Relationship between the support for the welfare state and civism, measured using
different questions.
Dependent variable: support for the welfare state
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Civism (benefits) -0.162***
(0.035)
Civism (transport) -0.149***
(0.037)
Civism (taxes) -0.072**
(0.036)
Civism (bribe) -0.082**
(0.035)
Civism (litter) -0.292***
(0.076)
Civism (stolen goods) -0.188***
(0.056)
Trust 0.166***
(0.030)
Age 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Male -0.101*** -0.099*** -0.098*** -0.097*** -0.205*** -0.097** -0.087***
(0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.051) (0.036) (0.020)
Education -0.108*** -0.105*** -0.106*** -0.106*** -0.136*** -0.133*** -0.107***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.021) (0.013) (0.009)
Income -0.090*** -0.095*** -0.092*** -0.092*** -0.086*** -0.099*** -0.094***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.017) (0.009)
Religiosity 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.035** 0.011 0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.013) (0.009) (0.005)
Political orientation -0.138*** -0.138*** -0.137*** -0.138*** -0.174*** -0.150*** -0.137***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.022) (0.019) (0.010)
Married Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference
Separated / Divorced 0.000 -0.009 0.003 0.000 -0.095 -0.021 -0.000
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.108) (0.089) (0.042)
Widowed 0.057 0.045 0.057 0.061 -0.026 0.104 0.057
(0.042) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.085) (0.076) (0.041)
Never married 0.007 0.013 0.021 0.022 -0.003 -0.068 0.011
(0.028) (0.030) (0.028) (0.028) (0.070) (0.050) (0.028)
Employed Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference
Unemployed 0.139*** 0.137*** 0.136*** 0.138*** 0.087 0.160** 0.145***
(0.038) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.060) (0.077) (0.039)
In education 0.054 0.052 0.050 0.044 -0.135 0.065 0.066
(0.049) (0.050) (0.049) (0.048) (0.095) (0.096) (0.047)
Retired 0.130*** 0.114** 0.128*** 0.130*** 0.180 0.199*** 0.129***
(0.046) (0.044) (0.046) (0.045) (0.107) (0.066) (0.045)
Other 0.065** 0.066* 0.071** 0.070** 0.000 0.032 0.046
(0.033) (0.034) (0.032) (0.032) (0.060) (0.063) (0.035)
Observations 138965 133242 141945 142192 22538 47757 144291
R-squared 0.111 0.109 0.110 0.110 0.154 0.105 0.113
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. White heteroskedastic standard errors (clustered by country × wave) in parentheses. OLS
regressions. Data from World Values Survey. All regressions include year and country fixed effects, and a constant term. The
support for the welfare state is measured using the following question: “I’d like you to tell me your views on various issues. How
would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree
completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between.
We need larger income differences as incentives versus Incomes should be made more equal”. Variables starting with Civism are
equal to 1 if the respondent answers “never justifiable” to the following question: “Please tell me for each of the following statements
whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card”; variables are equal to 0 for
all other answers. Statements used are: “Claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled”; “Avoiding a fare on public
transport”; “Cheating on taxes when you have a chance”; “Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties”; “Throwing away
litter in a public place”; “Buying stolen goods”. Trust is measured using the following question: “Generally speaking, would you say
that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” The variable equals 1 for “Most people
can be trusted” and 0 for “Can’t be too careful”. Other covariates are described in the appendix.
Table 5: Relationship between the support for the welfare state, trust, and perceived behavior
of compatriots.
Dependent variable: support for the welfare state
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Most people can be trusted 0.071***
(0.013)
Most people try to be fair 0.052***
(0.013)
Most people try to be helpful 0.047***
(0.012)
Many people manage to obtain benefits and 0.203***
services to which they are not entitled (0.027)
Most unemployed people do not 0.231***
really try to find a job (0.037)
Employees often pretend they are 0.178***
sick in order to stay at home (0.027)
Age 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.010***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Male -0.049 -0.039 -0.041 -0.051 -0.050 -0.036
(0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037)
Education 0.015** 0.017** 0.018** 0.016** 0.012* 0.015*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Income 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
Religiosity 0.014** 0.015** 0.015** 0.016** 0.017*** 0.019***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Political orientation -0.117*** -0.118*** -0.117*** -0.112*** -0.104*** -0.112***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028)
Married Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference
Separated / Divorced -0.028 -0.031 -0.030 -0.038 -0.036 -0.025
(0.050) (0.049) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.050)
Widowed -0.102** -0.107** -0.106** -0.094** -0.098** -0.098**
(0.044) (0.042) (0.044) (0.041) (0.043) (0.045)
Never married 0.094*** 0.093*** 0.100*** 0.108*** 0.102*** 0.108***
(0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032)
Employed Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference
Unemployed 0.167** 0.163** 0.157** 0.129** 0.084 0.134**
(0.061) (0.062) (0.061) (0.060) (0.055) (0.063)
In education 0.195** 0.200** 0.208** 0.195** 0.193** 0.205**
(0.091) (0.089) (0.088) (0.089) (0.089) (0.086)
Disabled 0.304*** 0.285*** 0.283*** 0.247** 0.274*** 0.241**
(0.096) (0.099) (0.095) (0.092) (0.093) (0.097)
Retired 0.164*** 0.156*** 0.152*** 0.160*** 0.175*** 0.173***
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.042)
Other 0.082 0.081 0.081 0.073 0.071 0.086
(0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.059) (0.056) (0.054)
Observations 30605 30505 30570 29795 30394 29882
R-squared 0.094 0.091 0.091 0.097 0.102 0.097
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. White heteroskedastic standard errors (clustered at the country level) in parentheses. OLS
regressions. Data from European Social Survey, round 4. All regressions include country fixed effects and a constant term. The
support for the welfare state is measured using the following question: “Many social benefits and services are paid by taxes. If
the government had to choose between increasing taxes and spending more on social benefits and services, or decreasing taxes and
spending less on social benefits and services, which should they do?”. Answers range from 0, “Government should decrease taxes
a lot and spend much less on social benefits and services”, to 10, “Government should increase taxes a lot and spend much more
on social benefits and services”. The variable most people can be trusted is the answer, on a scale from 0 to 10, to the following
question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with
people? ”. The variable most people try to be fair is the answer, on a scale from 0 to 10, to the following question: “Do you think
that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair? ”. The variable most people
try to be helpful is the answer, on a scale from 0 to 10, to the following question: “Would you say that most of the time people try to
be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves? ”. The last three independent variables are approvals to the following
statements: “Many people manage to obtain benefits and services to which they are not entitled”, “Most unemployed people do
not really try to find a job”, and “Employees often pretend they are sick in order to stay at home”. Answers range from 1 if the
respondent agrees strongly, to 5 if he disagrees strongly. Other covariates are described in the appendix.
